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Fishback v. Commonwealth
532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000)
L Facts
Richard David Fishback ("Fishback") was convicted by a jury of
robbery, three counts of abduction, and four firearms charges for the
robbery of the employees of a convenience store in January 1997.1 During
the penalty-determination phase, defense counsel proffered two jury instruc-
tions. The first jury instruction ("No. S") stated "there is no parole in
Virginia."2 The second proffered jury instruction ("No. T") stated "assume
[the defendant] will actually serve all of the jail or prison time you find to
be an appropriate sentence and you are not otherwise to concern yourselves
with what may happen afterwards."3 The judge asked defense counsel if she
had authority for the proffered instructions. Defense counsel responded
that she had no authority for the first instruction but that it reflected "the
current state of the law now."" Defense counsel further responded that the
second instruction was designed to address questions that juries typically ask
regarding the amount of time a defendant will serve upon being sentenced.
The judge refused to give either of the proffered instructions. During
deliberations, the jury questioned the judge about how the sentence would
be imposed.' After discussion with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the
trial judge gave the jury the Commonwealth's model instruction which did
not inform the jury that parole had been abolished. Defense counsel did
not object to the instruction or renew her objection to the refusal to in-
struct the jury that parole had been abolished.6 The jury returned verdicts
of thirty years imprisonment for the robbery; seven years for each abduc-
tion; and eighteen years for the firearms charges.7 The judge ordered the
sentences to run concurrently and suspended fifty-one years of the sentence
on the condition that Fishback serve ten years probation upon his release!
1. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629,630 (Va. 2000).
2. Id. (quoting proposed jury instruction No. S).
3. Id. (quoting proposed jury instruction No. 1).
4. Id.
5. Id. The jury sent a note to the judge, asking the following- (1) if the terms would
run coxisecutively or concurrently; (2) if the sentence could be reduced by the judge; and (3)
if the defendant qualified for parole. Id.





Fishbackpetitioned for appeal in the Court of Appeals of Virginia on
the following issues: (1) sufficiency of the evidence to prove the abductions
and abduction-related firearms charges; (2) denial of a motion to suppress;
(3) refusal of an instruction defining abduction; and (4) refusal of the instruc-
tion concerning the abolition of parole in Vir *a. The Court of Appeals
of V'irgi"ia awarded a ppeal on all issues except for the refused instruction on
parole." The court of appeals affirmed Fish-back's convictions."0 Fishback
then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia and reasserted all the claims
he made to the court of appeals. The Supreme Court of Virginia awarded
an appeal, but limited the appeal to the sole issue of whether the trial court
erred in refusing the defendant's instruction concerning the abolition of
parole."
Ig Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that juries shall be instructed as a
matter of law that parole has been abolished for non-capital felony offenses
committed on or after January 1, 1995.12 Where the defendant's age makes
geriatric release a possibility, the jury will be instructed on the provisions
of the geriatric release statute." However, the court found that the consider-
ation of good behavior credits by juries is too speculative and held that juries
will not be instructed that defendants could be eligible for release based on
good behavior. 4 The court determined that the jury's knowledge of the
abolition of parole was vital to the penalty determination phase of
Fishback's case and vacated his sentence.'" His case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals of Virginia with orders to remand to the trial court for a
new sentencing hearing."'
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
In Coward v. Commonwealth,7 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the jury may not be instructed on the possibility of parole." The policy
behind the holding was to preserve the separate roles of the judiciary in
9. Id. The Court of Appeals noted in its order denying Fishback's claim that it
previously held that the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on a defendant's
eligibility of parole in non-capital cases. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 634.
13. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2000).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 635.
16. Id.
17. 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935).




assessing punishment and the executive in administering it. 9 The enactment
of section 53.1-165.1 of the Virginia Code, abolishing parole, has eroded the
policy underlying the Coward rule.2" Under section 53.1-40.01, prisoners
serving life sentences for class one felonies are ineligible for geriatric
release. As a result, defendants convicted of capital murder for crimes
committed on or after January 1, 1995, are ineligible for parole or release
from prison.' In Yarbrough v. Commonwealth,2 the court declined to apply
the Coward rule in capital cases." The Yarbrougb court held that a defen-
dant convicted of capital murder was entitled to an instruction that he
would be parole-ineligible if sentenced to life imprisonment.2 ' However, the
dissent in Yarbrough suggested that the Commonwealth should be permitted
an instruction on the possibility of executive clemency.
26
The continued viability of the Coward rule in non-capital felony cases
was questioned but not decided in Yarbrough. In Fisbback, the Supreme
Court of Virginia addressed the continued application of the Coward rule
in non-capital felony cases.2" The court's main concern was balancing the
goal of "truth in sentencing" with the preservation of the separate functions
of the judiciary and the executive." The Supreme Court of Virginia re-
solved the concern for preserving the separate functions of the judiciary and
the executive by looking to Virginia Code section 53.1-165.1.3 The court
was satisfied that the statute left no room for the jury to speculate about
19. Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 632 (citing Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704,706
(Va. 1978)).
20. VA. CODE ANN. 5 53.1-165.1 (Mlichie 2000); see Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 633.
21. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (fichie 2000); see also Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 631.
22. Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 631.
23. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
24. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999).
25. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 616. This instruction was already required in cases where
the Commonwealth presented evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. See Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994) (holding that when the state raises the specter
of defendant's future dangerousness due process requires that the jury be instructed that life
imprisonment means life without the possibility of parole). The Virginia General Assembly
recently amended Virginia Code S 19.2-264.4 to encompass the Yarbrough holding. Fishback,
532 S.E.2d at 632 n.3; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000).
26. Fisbback, 532 S.E.2d at 634 n.4. In Fisbback, the court answered the question left
open in Yarbrougb and held that because jury consideration of the possibility of executive
clemency would be pure speculation, the Commonwealth will not be permitted an instruc-
tion on the matter of executive clemency. Id. The portion of the holding concerning
executive clemency implicates capital cases as well as non-capital cases. Id. at 634.
27. Id. at 631.
28. Id. at 631-32.
29. Id. at 632.
30. Id. Virginia Code 5 53.1-165.1 reads in part, "[a]ny person sentenced to a term of
incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible
for parole upon that offense." VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000).
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how the defendant's sentence would be imposed, nor did the statute give
discretion to the executive in administering the sentence imposed." The
court found it "simply defies reason" that the jury not be instructed by the
trial court regarding the abolition of parole." The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that "henceforth juries shall be instructed, as a matter of law,
on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or
after January 1, 1995, pursuant to Code section 53.1-165.1""
However, the court recognized that defendants in non-capital felony
cases could be eligible for geriatric release or early release on the basis of
good behavior credits.' The court considered geriatric release as "in the
nature of a parole statute."35 The court distinguished geriatric release from
sentence reduction on the basis of good behavior." Geriatric release in-
volves a mathematical calculation that is readily determinable and not
subject to speculation."' The court held that because geriatric release is a
form of parole and that determination of eligibility was not speculative,
juries in appropriate cases should be instructed on the possibility of geriatric
release. 8 The Supreme Court of Virginia found that good behavior sentence
reductions, in contrast to geriatric release, are speculative and based on
unpredictable factors such as the defendant's behavior and the executive
branch's largely subjective evaluation of that behavior." The court found
that the speculative nature of the possibility of early release based on good
behavior credit supported the holding of Coward that juries should not be
instructed on the possibility of parole.' As a result, the court held that
31. Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 633.
32. Id. The court found that
within dhe permissible range of punishment a jury is required to determine a
specific term of onfinement that it considers to be an ap propriate punishment
under all the circumstances revealed in the case. A jury should not be required
to perform this critical and difficult responsibility without the benefit of all
signficant and appropriate information that would avoid the necessity that it
speculate or act upon misconceptions conceringthe effect 
of its decision. Surely
a properly informed jury ensures a fair trial both to the defendant and the
Commonwealth.
Id.
33. Id. at 634.
34. Id. at 632.
35. Id. at'633.
36. Id. at 634.
37.. Id.
38. Id. The court reasoned that the policy underlying the Coward rule (the preserva-
tion of the separate functions of the judiciary and the executive) retains validity;because good
behavior release is solely at the discretion of the executive branch, sentencing juries should





juries are not to be instructed on the possibility of good behavior sentence
reductions.41
In Fishback, the Supreme Court of Virginia partially overruled Coward.
The court's analysis of Coward in light of the abolition of parole established
that the Coward rule did not retain its validity in every circumstance. The
court set out a new procedural rule that requires that juries in felony cases
be instructed that parole has been abolished, but that when the particular
facts make geriatric release a possibility the Commonwealth is entitled to an
instruction regarding geriatric release.42 The court applied this new proce-
dural rule43 to Fishback's appeal and noted that deficiencies in his proffered
instruction did not bar consideration of the appeal." Although the general
rule is that the trial court is not required to amend erroneous instructions,
the rule is limited when the error in the instruction is materially vital to the
defendant.4 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the jury's knowledge
of the abolition of parole was materially vital to the penalty-determination
phase of Fishback's trial. Thus, Fishback will receive a new sentencing
hearing.'
IV Conclusion
In Fishback, the Supreme Court of Virginia answered the question
raised by the Yarbrough dissent. It held that the Commonwealth will not
* be permitted an instruction on the possibility of executive clemency.47 This
portion of the holding implicates capital cases as well as non-capital felony
cases." Thus, after Fishback and Yarbrough, juries in all Virginia capital cases
must be instructed that "life means life." At the same time, the Common-
wealth is precluded from arguing or proffering a jury instruction stating that
the possibility of executive clemency could result in a defendant's release




43. Id. The court held that, because the rule developed in Fisbback was a new rule of
criminal procedure, application of the rule is limited to cases not yet final as of June 9, 2000.
Id. (citing Mueller v. Murray, 478 S.E.2d 542, 546 (Va. 1996)).
44. Id. at 635.
45. Id. (citing Whaley v. Commonwealth, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (Va. 1973)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 634.
48. Id.
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